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Making Sure "The Buck Stops Here": Barring
Executives for Corporate Violations
Peter J. Henringt
When the sentence for a crime is not quickly carried out, the
hearts of the people are filled with schemes to do wrong.
Ecclesiastes 8:11
INTRODUCTION
The movement called "Occupy Wall Street" has sought to
take over locations in New York City and elsewhere to protest
what it sees as corporate greed and corruption that have led to a
growing inequality between powerful moneyed interests and "the
other 99 percent." The protests in some ways harken back to the
1960s, with large numbers arrested amidst accusations of police
brutality, although unlike earlier efforts to stop the Vietnam
War, it is not clear what the protesters hope to accomplish be-
yond voicing their objection to the status quo. A prominent target
of their ire is bankers, with one protester quoted as saying, "I
think a good deal of the bankers should be in jail"1-although no
particular crime was identified. The protests seem to be a reac-
tion, at least in part, to reports in the media vilifying leading
financial firms for their role in the subprime mortgage crisis,
which triggered the highest home foreclosure rates since the
Great Depression as well as persistent unemployment. 2 A com-
monly expressed complaint has been about the absence of any
signature criminal prosecutions of corporate chieftains, who
many believe were responsible for the losses suffered by so many.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Ex-
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. The author may be contact-
ed at peter.henning@wayne.edu. I appreciate the many helpful comments and sugges-
tions of my Wayne State University Law School colleagues at our works-in-progress pro-
gram.
1 Andrew Ross Sorkin, On Wall Street, a Protest Matures, NY Times B1 (Oct 4,
2011).
2 For examples of these media portrayals see generally http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/subjects/c/credit-crisis/index.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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change Commission (SEC) have been derided for their failure to
pursue those who are presumed to have engaged in wrongdoing.
In short, the question often asked is, "Why hasn't anyone been
sent to jail for the financial meltdown?".
A quite different criticism of the criminal justice system,
particularly from academics, is that the United States suffers
from "overcriminalization," a term used to encapsulate much
that ails the American criminal justice system. Unlike the
lament that no financial leader has been prosecuted, overcrimi-
nalization has been identified as the cause-or the product-of
too many crimes, too long sentences, too many prisoners, too
broad interpretations of statutes, too much invasion of state sov-
ereignty by the federal government, and too expansive prosecuto-
rial discretion, along with too few resources for defendants to
fight this onslaught and too little public attention paid to the
problem. As Professor Darryl Brown noted,
Few topics find more unanimity across the ideological
spectrum of criminal law scholars and Washington policy
advocates interested in the criminal law than the conclu-
sion that the United States suffers from too much crimi-
nal law-although the sentiment seems to be shared by a
much smaller portion of legislators, prosecutors and-
most worrisomely or tellingly-the public.3
There is an interesting juxtaposition in assessing how the
criminal justice system should deal with large business organiza-
tions. While the public has no problem when a company is prose-
cuted to the same extent as an individual,4 those who consider
the theoretical foundations for the criminal law express serious
reservations with corporate prosecutions. Some scholars have
even called for an end to corporate criminal liability altogether,5
3 Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law's Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law,
7 J L Econ & Pol 657, 657 (2011).
4 See Bertram F. Malle, The Social and Moral Cognition of Group Agents, 19 J L &
Pol 95, 136 (2010) ("Humans have no trouble reasoning about the actions and minds of
groups and have the desire to blame and punish them when they act immorally."); Steven
J. Sherman and Elise J. Percy, The Psychology of Collective Responsibility: When and
Why Collective Entities Are Likely to Be Held Responsible for the Misdeeds of Individual
Members, 19 J L & Pol 137, 139 (2010) ("[A] high level of coherence in collective entities,
such as corporations, can lead to judgments of collective intentionality and responsibility;
in such cases, it therefore makes legal sense to treat corporations as individuals.").
- See John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 46 Am Crim L Rev 1329, 1329 (2009) (arguing that "there
is no theoretical justification for corporate criminal liability.").
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or at least a significant curtailment of the application of criminal
laws to organizations.6 They see the use of criminal laws to pros-
ecute corporations as an improper expansion of principles of
moral responsibility. The primary focus of the criminal law is on
an individual's conduct, and extending it to entities that cannot
form the intent necessary to commit a crime can only be accom-
plished through the operation of the legal fiction of vicarious lia-
bility.7 For example, Professor John Hasnas wrote, "Corporate
punishment is vicarious collective punishment. Collective pun-
ishment is inherently unjust. Hence, to the extent that assigning
moral responsibility to corporations authorizes corporate pun-
ishment, corporate moral responsibility is unjust."8
The public perception of corporations is that they are re-
sponsible for the actions of those who work for them.9 In this
view, not only should the organization be held accountable, but
those in positions of authority should be liable for a company's
actions, even if they might not have been directly involved in the
misconduct. Stories in the mainstream media about the financial
meltdown that culminated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers
in September 2008 operate on the assumption that criminal con-
6 See Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think about the Punishment of Corpora-
tions, 46 Am Crim L Rev 1359, 1367 (2009) ("The embarrassment of corporate criminal
liability is that it punishes the innocent along with the guilty."); Andrew Weissmann, A
New Approach to Corporate Criminal Liability, 44 Am Crim L Rev 1319, 1341-42 (2007)
(arguing that corporate criminal liability should require the government to prove that a
corporation did not have an effective compliance program in place at the time of the of-
fense).
7 See New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co v United States, 212 US 481,
493-97 (1909) (holding a corporation criminally liable for the acts of an authorized agent).
8 John Hasnas, Where is Felix Cohen When We Need Him?: Transcendental Nonsense
and the Moral Responsibility of Corporations, 19 J L & Pol 55, 80 (2010).
9 See, for example, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.04 (2006). Section 7.04 pro-
vides:
A principal is subject to liability to a third party harmed by an agent's conduct
when the agent's conduct is within the scope of the agent's actual authority or
ratified by the principal; and (1) the agent's conduct is tortious, or (2) the
agent's conduct, if that of the principal, would subject the principal to tort liabil-
ity.
Id. In the criminal law, the Supreme Court has applied the tort doctrine of respondeat
superior to make the corporation liable for the acts of its agents. In New York Central the
Court stated:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in hold-
ing that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him to
make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the interest of public policy,
by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corpora-
tion for which he is acting in the premises.
212 US at 494.
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duct by corporations, particularly Wall Street and other financial
firms, contributed significantly to the losses suffered by investors
and the broader economy. That leads to the common complaint
about the absence of any criminal prosecutions of leaders of the
large financial firms that collapsed, such as Lehman Brothers or
Bear Stearns; that were bailed out by the federal government,
like American International Group; or even ones that ultimately
thrived, like Goldman Sachs. Because no high-profile chief exec-
utives have been charged with a crime, or even sued by the SEC
in a civil fraud enforcement action, the conclusion is that Wall
Street will not be held accountable for the harms it inflicted
through reckless investment strategies exacerbated by disas-
trous financial engineering.
This presents a sharp contrast to the accounting disasters
that came to light in 2002, leading to the convictions of chief ex-
ecutives like Jeffrey Skilling of Enron, Bernie Ebbers of World-
Com, and John Rigas of Adelphia Communications, for a range of
crimes related to the collapse of their companies.10 One can dis-
miss the accusations of the mainstream media as a product of
ignorance or, perhaps worse, pandering from desperate conglom-
erates afflicted with a shrinking subscriber base who simply
want to generate "heat" in the public perception. One could also
conclude that the federal government is partially responsible for
building public expectations that prosecutions will take place in
response to highly public events. Attorney General Eric H. Hold-
er Jr testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in
January 2010:
[T]he Justice Department is using every tool at our dis-
posal-including new resources, advanced technologies
and communications capabilities, and the very best talent
we have-to prevent, prosecute and punish these crimes.
And by taking dramatic action, our goal is not just to hold
accountable those whose conduct may have contributed to
the last meltdown, but to deter such future conduct as
well."
10 See Jean Eaglesham, The Shadow of Enron Still Lingers, Wall St J C1 (Oct 17,
2011) (quoting a former FBI agent, who stated that "[tihere simply has not been the all-
out, focused effort the Justice Department mounted to address the savings-and-loan crisis
and corporate-fraud epidemic led by Enron, WorldCom and the hundreds of cases that
followed").
11 DOJ, Attorney General Eric Holder Testifies before the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission (Jan 14, 2010), online at http://www.justice.gov/ag/testimony/2010/ag-
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This type of rhetoric has not been limited to issues arising
from the financial crisis. Just a few months later, on June 1,
2010, the Attorney General issued a statement regarding the
Gulf oil spill asserting that the DOJ "will make certain that
those responsible clean up the mess they have made and restore
or replace the natural resources lost or injured in this tragedy.
And we will prosecute to the full extent any violations of the
law."12 Not surprisingly, neither academic complaints about un-
stoppable overcriminalization, especially regarding the use of the
criminal law against corporations, nor a pervasive perception
that executives have avoided accountability for corporate crimes
appears to be entirely correct. Professor Brown pointed out that
"[a]n overlooked story in the history of American criminal law is
the ongoing process of decriminalization." 13 On the enforcement
side, there have been a number of prosecutions of mortgage fraud
involving brokers, bank officers, and buyers, although, as is typi-
cal of that offense, the cases are local in nature and do not in-
volve large financial institutions. In a case with national implica-
tions, Lee Farkas, the former chief executive of private mortgage
lender Taylor, Bean & Whitaker, was convicted in April 2011 on
charges related to what prosecutors described as a $2.9 billion
fraud scheme involving thousands of home loans, and he received
a thirty-year prison term. 14 While these steps can be assailed as
mere blips that pale in comparison with the assumption that
there were many crimes but not enough prosecutions of corporate
testimony-100114.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
12 DOJ, Remarks by Attorney General Eric Holder on Gulf Oil Spill (June 1, 2010),
online at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2010/ag-speech-100601.html (visited Sept
10, 2012).
13 Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex L Rev 223, 225 (2007)
(emphasis omitted). For example, there is a growing trend toward decriminalization of
marijuana, albeit in fits and starts, but at the least there is a push to de-emphasize use of
the criminal law to punish possession of small amounts, along with growing tolerance for
personal use and cultivation. A bill called the "Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act
of 2011" has been sponsored by Representatives Barney Frank and Ron Paul-one could
hardly identify two more ideologically diverse members of Congress-to limit the federal
government's role in prosecuting possession of marijuana, which can be seen as an effort
to stem the tide of criminalization. See HR 2306, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (June 23, 2011), in
157 Cong Rec H4526 (June 23, 2011). See also Ekow N. Yankah, A Paradox in Overcrimi-
nalization, 14 New Crim L Rev 1, 3 (2011) ("Despite what otherwise seems like the relent-
less creep of criminal law, important American jurisdictions are currently conducting a
very public reexamination and, in many cases, recession of state drug laws surrounding
the use of marijuana.").
14 See DOJ Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, Press Release, Former Chair-
man of Taylor, Bean & Whitaker Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison and Ordered to Forfeit
$38.5 Million (June 30, 2011), online at http://www.stopfraud.gov/news/news-06302011-
2.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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executives, they do show that there has been some effort made by
prosecutors, even if it has not satisfied the public thirst for
vengeance.
The question of executive accountability is a vexing one that
leads to public mistrust of government and financial firms, en-
gendering the perception that the system is rigged so that those
with great wealth can easily avoid meaningful enforcement of
the law. In addition, recurrent complaints about excessive com-
pensation of CEOs appear to go largely unheeded,15 and even
those corporate chieftains fired from their jobs for not meeting
shareholder or board expectations walk away with multimillion-
dollar severance packages.16 This corporate generosity comes in
the face of persistent unemployment that has led to declining pay
and home ownership for the middle class. It is not a crime to
make a lot of money, and corporate boards eagerly lavish lucra-
tive contracts on executives that pay far above what the average
American will ever see in a lifetime of work. So calls for putting a
few executives in jail may be more a complaint about the lack of
effective means to hold those who wield corporate power respon-
sible when a company engages in persistent misconduct or oper-
ates in a way that costs shareholders and employees their in-
vestments. Unlike shareholders, corporate officers are largely
insulated from the impact of their decisions, and even keep the
outsized gains reaped before a corporate decline. Unfortunately,
the criminal law is at best an imperfect tool for policing corporate
executives. Establishing an individual's guilt requires proof of
the person's intent to violate the law, or at least recklessness,
unless the mens rea requirement for criminal liability is lowered
to such a degree that occupying a corporate office can result in
being punished criminally for the misconduct of others. While
15 See, for example, Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive
Pay: Contractual Unconscionability, 96 Iowa L Rev 1177, 1179 (2011).
Executive pay has skyrocketed in recent decades, stoked by stock-based compo-
nents extolled under a three-pronged theoretical logic that proved problematic
in practice. . . . Law fueled the engine: federal tax law encouraged stock-based
pay; federal securities-disclosure law stimulated a ratcheting up as executives
sought raises to beat their peers; and Delaware, free of competition from other
states in setting the nation's corporate laws, looked the other way.
Id.
16 See James B. Stewart, Rewarding C.E.O.'s Who Fail, NY Times BI (Oct 1, 2011)
("Just three years after the financial crisis generated widespread public outrage that Wall
Street chief executives walked away with hundreds of millions in bonuses and other com-
pensation after driving their companies into insolvency and plunging the nation's econo-
my into crisis, multimillion-dollar pay for failure is flourishing like never before.").
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that approach has been employed in limited circumstances, pri-
marily for environmental violations and food and drug safety
cases, it is an approach that radically changes how the penal law
traditionally uses the intent requirement to separate innocent
conduct from criminal violations.17 Demands to police Wall Street
by just sending a few executives to jail risk making questionable
corporate decision making into a crime.
Because the criminal law is not well equipped to impose
wider individual responsibility for corporate criminal acts, it is
worth considering whether there are means to enhance the ac-
countability of executives for organizational misconduct through
civil enforcement mechanisms. Banking regulators can remove
an officer or director from a corporate position if the person's
conduct jeopardizes the safety and soundness of a financial insti-
tution.18 A provision of the Social Security Act gives the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services the authority to exclude
from federal health care programs an officer or managing em-
ployee of a company that has been convicted of specified
healthcare offenses.19
Using those types of approaches, one modest means to police
management of public companies would be to enhance the au-
thority of the SEC to seek the removal of executives from compa-
nies that violate the law to ensure that senior managers are held
responsible for corporate misconduct, even if they are not directly
implicated in the violation. Managers who oversee the operations
of a corporation should bear at least some responsibility for seri-
ous or persistent wrongdoing by the organization, even if they
cannot be prosecuted for a particular violation. The SEC already
has the power to bar an executive from future service as an of-
ficer or director of a publicly traded company for individual viola-
tions of the securities laws. 20 Authorizing the agency to seek a
bar for an individual executive based on corporate misconduct
17 See Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the
Bill of Rights, 15 Temple Envir L & Tech J 161, 165 (1996) ("The most alarming aspect of
environmental prosecutions is that business owners and operators cannot avail them-
selves of many of the constitutional protections explicitly set forth in the Bill of Rights.");
Richard Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental
Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Georgetown L J 2407, 2445 (1995)
("[Ajlthough criminal law requires clear, determinate, and readily accessible legal stand-
ards, familiar to the general public, environmental law is replete with obscure, indeter-
minate, and highly technical standards, the meaning of which few can claim genuine
mastery.").
8 See 12 USC § 1818(e).
to See 42 USC § 1320a-7(b)(15).
20 See 15 USC §§ 77H-1(f), 78u(d).
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would enhance management's incentives to ensure the corpora-
tion complies with the law and does not push its employees to
operate at the edges of legality in the hope that they will avoid
detection or, if necessary, pay the cost of any settlement with
little fear that senior executives will bear direct responsibility for
organizational misconduct.
Such an approach would be a step toward lessening the
moral hazard problem that cropped up so prominently in 2008
when the "too big to fail" policy led to the bailout of a number of
financial companies. 21 This authority would in all likelihood be
used sparingly because any exclusion should require proof that
the corporation engaged in significant or persistent misconduct
that was more than an isolated violation or the result of a rogue
employee.
One criterion for holding executives responsible for corporate
misconduct would be to determine whether they effectively toler-
ated the actions by turning a blind eye to them or exerted inap-
propriate pressure on employees to produce favorable results re-
gardless of the potential illegality of the conduct. Among the con-
siderations that would go into this assessment are the frequency
of violations, the level within an organization at which wrongdo-
ing occurred, and whether management allowed profit goals to
trump internal controls or compliance programs.
Part I of this Article looks at the claim that the lack of crim-
inal prosecutions from the financial meltdown can be attributed
to a failure by the DOJ to aggressively pursue evidence of
wrongdoing, a view that may not be correct because proving that
an executive committed a crime is much more difficult than is
often perceived.
Part II considers the overcriminalization criticism that ap-
plication of the criminal law to corporations and their executives
has proven problematic, which counsels against expanding the
21 See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L Rev 183, 204-05 (2009).
Moral hazard arises when an actor does not bear all of the consequences of his
actions. It is particularly acute when he can profit by taking risks that he does
not fully bear. Asset managers who profit from the gains earned using other
people's money face a moral hazard. Since they do not bear the full cost of a loss
of capital and since higher returns are correlated with higher risk, an asset
manager has the incentive to take additional risk in order to earn additional re-
turns.
Id.
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criminal law just to make it easier to pursue the prosecution of
corporate executives.
Part III considers an administrative alternative to using the
criminal law as the primary means to police corporate execu-
tives, focusing on how the power to exclude corporate executives
from holding a position of authority with public corporations
might be one means to address the frustration over the perceived
lack of accountability for corporate misconduct. While it does not
carry the stigma of a criminal prosecution, an administrative
remedy can be a more effective way to police corporate manage-
ment by avoiding having to denigrate the intent requirement for
criminal liability while enhancing the power of the government
to seek some accountability from managers for the conduct of the
organization-putting into effect the old adage that "the buck
stops here."
I. THE "FAILURE" TO PROSECUTE CORPORATE WRONGDOING
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2008 there
were almost 4.9 million crimes of violence, and over 16.3 million
property-related offenses. 22 The most common crime in the Unit-
ed States is theft, and in 2010 there were three times as many
property crimes as violent offenses. 23 The number of property
crimes has been decreasing since the late 1970s, while the rate of
serious violent crimes has dropped since 1990.24 The overall
prosecution rate is much lower, and less than half of all crimes
committed are being reported to the police. 25 Professor Alexandra
Natapoff discussed underenforcement of the criminal law, point-
ing out that "in some neighborhoods, street crime is officially ac-
cepted as a fact of life." 2 6 Another author posited that
"[u]nderenforcement results not in direct, cognizable harm to
individuals, but rather in indirect harm deriving from accepted
lawlessness."27
22 See Michael R. Rand, Criminal Victimization, 2008, Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin, 1 (DOJ Sept 2009), online at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf (visit-
ed Sept 10, 2012).
23 Jennifer L. Truman, Criminal Victimization, 2010, Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin, 2 (DOJ Sept 2011), online at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv1O.pdf
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
24 Id at 2-3.
25 Id at 1 ("About 50% of all violent victimizations and nearly 40% of property crimes
were reported to the police in 2010. These percentages have remained stable over the past
10 years.").
26 Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 Fordham L Rev 1715, 1722 (2006).
27 Christopher Angevine, Amnesty and the "Legality" of Illegal Immigration: Ilow
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Not all failures to prosecute are necessarily bad, of course,
and an argument has even been made that underenforcement of
vice laws may be "the most effective strategy for deterring con-
sensual conduct that violates a widely shared moral norm."2 8 In
the area of corporate crime, the perception of rampant lawless-
ness in the upper strata of society certainly appears to have firm-
ly taken hold. In the book Tangled Webs: How False Statements
Are Undermining America: From Martha Stewart to Bernie
Madoff, James Stewart wrote that "prosecutors have told me re-
peatedly that a surge of concerted, deliberate lying by a different
class of criminal-sophisticated, educated, affluent, and repre-
sented in many cases by the best lawyers-threatens to swamp
the legal system and undermine the prosecution of white-collar
crime."2 9 One can dismiss such claims as reflective of the prose-
cutorial point of view, which sees lying everywhere. Indeed, ask
any trial lawyer and he or she will say that opponents lie all the
time, but his or her own clients never do, nor would the lawyer
continue to represent someone of that ilk. And Stewart acknowl-
edged the perception of pervasive lying was not subject to any
empirical testing, so that, "[b]ecause there are no statistics, it's
impossible to know for certain how much lying afflicts the judi-
cial process, and whether it's worse now than in previous dec-
ades."30 One can argue that high-profile perjury (and false
statement) cases in recent years, from "Scooter" Libby to Roger
Clemens, are just the tip of the iceberg, but there is no way to
know the size of the iceberg, or whether it has melted due to
global warming.
The perception that the perpetrators have gotten away with
something pervades the public discussion of the financial crisis.
A front-page New York Times article in April 2011 carried the
title "In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures," noting
at one point that "several years after the financial crisis, which
was caused in large part by reckless lending and excessive risk
taking by major financial institutions, no senior executives have
been charged or imprisoned, and a collective government effort
Reliance and Underenforcement Inform the Immigration Debate, 50 S Tex L Rev 235, 243
(2008).
28 Jonathan M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcement of Vice Laws, 54 Rutgers L
Rev 423, 426 (2002).
29 James B. Stewart, Tangled Webs: How False Statements Are Undermining Ameri-
ca: From Martha Stewart to Bernie Madoff xiv (Penguin 2011).
3o Id.
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has not emerged."31 A Wall Street Journal article in June 2011,
"Challenges in Chasing Fraud," described the position of un-
named "legal experts" that the relative dearth of SEC cases
against executives "reflect[s] the difficulty of going after specific
individuals and companies when so many more made decisions
that backfired into catastrophic losses during the financial cri-
sis."32 Likewise, Pulitzer Prize-winning writer Jesse Eisinger of
ProPublica lamented in December 2010 that "[n]obody from
Lehman, Merrill Lynch or Citigroup has been charged criminally
with anything. No top executives at Bear Stearns have been in-
dicted. All former American International Group executives are
running free. No big mortgage company executive has had to face
the law."33 In his acceptance speech upon winning Best Docu-
mentary at the 2011 Academy Awards for Inside Job, Charles
Ferguson said, "[T]hree years after a horrific financial crisis
caused by massive fraud, not a single financial executive has
gone to jail and that's wrong."34 The vilification of Wall Street
included this famous description of Goldman Sachs, one of Wall
Street's leading firms: "The world's most powerful investment
bank is a great vampire squid wrapped around the face of hu-
manity, relentlessly jamming its blood funnel into anything that
smells like money."35
31 Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story, In Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top
Figures, NY Times Al (Apr 14, 2011). For a list of the financial meltdown cases filed, see
Louise Story and Meghan Louttit, Tracking Financial Crisis Cases, (NY Times Feb 2,
2012) online at http: /www.nytimes.comlinteractive/business/financial-crisis-cases.html?s
rc=tptw (visited Sept 10, 2012). Another front-page article by Morgenson and Story dis-
cussed how the DOJ has become less aggressive in pursuing criminal cases as it works
more closely with companies that conduct internal investigations of wrongdoing, noting
that "some veterans of government prosecutions question such collaboration in financial
crisis cases, and contend they should have been pursued more aggressively." Gretchen
Morgenson and Louise Story, Behind the Gentler Approach to Banks by US, NY Times Al
(July 8, 2011).
32 Jean Eaglesham, Challenges in Chasing Fraud, Wall St J Cl (June 23, 2011).
3 Jesse Eisinger, Prosecutors Stage a Sideshow, While the Big Tent Is Empty, NY
Times B5 (Dec 9, 2010). In another article, he wrote, "No major investment banker has
been brought up on criminal charges stemming from the financial crisis. To understand
why that is so pathetic and-worse---corrupting, we need to briefly review what went on
in C.D.O.'s in the years before the crisis." Jesse Eisinger, In Fight Against Securities
Fraud, SEC Sends Wrong Signal, NY Times DealBook Blog (NY Times Oct 26, 2011),
online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/in-fight-against-securities-fraud-s-e-c-
sends-wrong-signall (visited Sept 10, 2012).
34 See Remarks of Charles Ferguson, quoted in Daniel B. Jeffs, Letter to the Editor,
Government Officials Share Blame in Financial Crisis, USA Today 8A (Mar 3, 2011).
35 Matt Taibbi, The Great American Bubble Machine, Rolling Stone 52, 52 (July 9-23,
2009). The author proceeded to describe how Goldman Sachs makes money in this way:
The bank's unprecedented reach and power have enabled it to turn all of Ameri-
ca into a giant pump-and-dump scam, manipulating whole economic sectors for
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Perhaps it is a measure of America's suspicion of class dis-
tinctions that the absence of prosecutions of senior corporate ex-
ecutives has fueled perceptions that vast wrongdoing has gone
unpunished, sometimes accompanied by conspiracy theories to
explain the lack of criminal enforcement. The entertainment in-
dustry frequently portrays financial firms as powerful black box-
es capable of controlling markets and manipulating industries to
enhance the wealth of a favored few, leading some to view finan-
cial troubles as the product of a grand-yet secret-design to
profit from the misery of others.36 The financial meltdown in
2008 has largely passed, but unlike the savings and loan crisis in
the late 1980s or the accounting scandals that hit in 2002, there
have been no signature prosecutions involving high-level corpo-
rate officers, stoking the fires of conspiracy theorists and Holly-
wood. Even the SEC, which faces a lower burden of proof because
its enforcement actions are civil rather than criminal, has
brought only a handful of cases naming senior executives at fi-
nancial firms that were at the center of the economic maelstrom.
It filed fraud charges against the former CEO of Countrywide
Credit, the largest mortgage firm before it was bought by Bank of
America in 2008, but a good portion of the $67.5 million settle-
ment paid to resolve the case was reimbursed under an indemni-
fication provision in the corporate bylaws. 37 No one from Lehman
Brothers has been accused of violating the securities laws, de-
spite an extensive report by a bankruptcy examiner accusing the
firm's executives of engaging in accounting gimmickry to move
billions of dollars of debt temporarily off of its books at the end of
years at a time, moving the dice game as this or that market collapses, and all
the time gorging itself on the unseen costs that are breaking families every-
where-high gas prices, rising consumer-credit rates, half-eaten pension funds,
mass layoffs, future taxes to pay off bailouts. All that money that you're losing,
it's going somewhere, and in both a literal and a figurative sense, Goldman
Sachs is where it's going: The bank is a huge, highly sophisticated engine for
converting the useful, deployed wealth of society into the least useful, most
wasteful and insoluble substance on Earth-pure profit for rich individuals.
Id at 54.
36 See Larry E. Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business *8 (Uni-
versity of Illinois Law and Economics Research Paper No LEO5-010, Mar 8, 2009), online
at http: /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=563181 (visited Sept 10, 2012)
("Many films present variations on the theme of a large dangerous corporation that is
ultimately thwarted by a frumpy Everyman, often a journalist, lawyer or employee of the
offending company.").
3 See Alex Dobuzinskis and Dan Levine, Mozilo Settles Countrywide Fraud Case at
$67.5 Million, (Reuters Oct 15, 2010), online at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2010/10/
15/us-sec-mozilo-idUSTRE69E4KN20101015 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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each quarter to make the firm appear healthier than it was.3 8
American International Group needed billions of dollars from the
federal government because of toxic derivatives it wrote for cli-
ents,39 yet no one not even the company-was accused of any
legal violations. How can so much money have been lost, yet no
one has been accused of doing anything illegal?
The presumption that criminal conduct explains a goodly
amount of the financial pain in 2008 means that someone should
be blamed for the "failure" to prosecute, which may even be
traceable to the President himself. In a New York Magazine arti-
cle, Frank Rich wrote, "What haunts the Obama administration
is what still haunts the country: the stunning lack of accountabil-
ity for the greed and misdeeds that brought America to its grav-
est financial crisis since the Great Depression. There has been no
legal, moral, or financial reckoning for the most powerful wrong-
doers."40 The existence of perceived victims proves that there
were crimes, such that "[a]s the ghost of Hamlet's father might
have it, America will be stalked by its foul and unresolved crimes
until they 'are burnt and purged away."'41 Political commentator
James Carville went a step further, urging President Obama to
fire Attorney General Holder if he does not receive satisfactory
answers about why no one connected to Wall Street has been in-
dicted.42
38 See Shahien Nasiripour, Lehman Bankruptcy Report: Top Officials Manipulated
Balance Sheets, JPMorgan and Citi Contributed to Collapse, (Huffington Post May 11,
2010), online at http: //www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/11/lehman-bankruptcy-
report n 495668.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
9 See Andrew J. Ceresney, Gordon Eng, and Sean R. Nuttall, Regulatory Investiga-
tions and the Credit Crisis: The Search for Villains, 46 Am Crim L Rev 225, 233-34
(2009). The authors explain:
Faced with massive losses in a unit of insurance giant American Insurance
Group ("AIG") that had sold credit default swap ("CDS") protection on mort-
gage-backed CDOs, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York provided $85 billion
emergency funding to the company in exchange for nearly 80% of its stock, after
deciding that its disorderly failure would have created too much disruption to
the nation's economy.
Id (citations omitted).
40 Frank Rich, Obama's Original Sin, New York Magazine 14, 16 (July 11, 2011).
41 Id.
42 See James Carville, What Should the White House Do? Panic!, CNN Online (CNN
Sept 14, 2011), online at http://www.cnn.com/2011/09/14/opinion/carville-white-house-
advice/index.html (visited Sept 10, 2012). Carville stated:
There are certain people in American finance who haven't been held responsible
for utterly ruining the economic fabric of our country. Demand from the attor-
ney general a clear status of the state of investigation concerning these extraor-
dinary injustices imposed upon the American people. I know Attorney General
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The absence of prosecutions related to the financial crisis al-
so serves as a handy touchstone when other cases do result in
prosecutions, evoking the "Why haven't real criminals been
charged yet?" complaint. In a New York Times commentary about
the government's investigation of Lance Armstrong for using per-
formance-enhancing drugs, the writer lamented: "Now here we
are, well into the second year of the Armstrong investigation,
and we are still waiting for criminal charges to be brought
against top executives at many of the firms that left our economy
in tatters."43 We have a combination of overcriminalization and
underenforcement based on a claim that it is unfair to pursue
charges against "[fill in the blank]" when those rapacious Wall
Street bankers have gotten away with obvious crimes. It is easy
to proclaim that the quickest way to reform Wall Street is to
hoist the heads of a few CEOs on the proverbial petard by throw-
ing them in jail. The criminal law has come to be seen by many,
including legislators, as just another tool to police business prac-
tices that were usually not subject to the scrutiny of law en-
forcement, and the logical result is to look for a few scapegoats to
be thrown in jail. In December 2009, at a Senate Judiciary
Committee hearing, Senator Edward Kaufman stated, "If we
want to restore the public's faith in our financial markets and
the rule of law, we must identify, prosecute, and send to prison
the participants in those markets who broke the law. Their
fraudulent conduct has severely damaged our economy and
harmed countless hardworking Americans."44
The problem with this view is that merely asserting that
corporate executives should be put in jail is far easier than actu-
ally proving a criminal charge consistent with the requirements
of due process. Crimes typically prosecuted in financial cases,
like fraud or false statements to the SEC, require the govern-
ment to prove a defendant's specific intent beyond a reasonable
Eric Holder is a close friend of yours, but if his explanations aren't good, fire
him too. Demand answers to why no one has been indicted.
Id.
" Jonathan Mahler, Why Clemens and Armstrong Aren't Worth Pursuing Anymore,
NY Times Dl (July 2, 2011). The author also noted that the United States Attorney's
Office in Los Angeles, which is pursuing the investigation of Armstrong, dropped its
grand jury inquiry into Angelo Mozilo, former CEO of Countrywide Mortgage, whose firm
wrote billions of dollars in toxic subprime mortgages-further proof, apparently, of those
who truly committed crimes having gotten away with them. See id.
44 Mortgage Fraud, Securities Fraud, and the Financial Meltdown: Prosecuting Those
Responsible, Hearing before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong, 2d Sess 2
(Dec 9, 2009) (statement of Senator Edward E. Kaufman).
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doubt.45 Unlike civil securities claims that can be established by
showing recklessness or, under some provisions, just negligence,
proof of intent to defraud can be quite daunting. Preet Bharara,
the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, described the hurdles faced when trying to prove a finan-
cial fraud even when it appears to everyone that there must have
been some illegal activity:
Maybe there's a lot of smoke-now comes the proof. This
guy's going to testify, "My accountant's a smart guy-I
just relied on my accountant." The accountant's going to
say, "I just relied on what he gave me," and everyone has
plausible deniability. That's a simple example of a way in
which people can get away with even criminal activity
when they're making false certifications to the govern-
ment.46
Pursuing criminal cases against corporate executives is diffi-
cult for other reasons, not the least of which is that the defend-
ants often have very deep pockets to fight the government be-
cause of their personal wealth-Raj Rajaratnam was reported to
have spent $40 million defending insider trading chargeS47 -or
because their company is required to foot the legal bill under
broad indemnification provisions found in most corporate char-
ters. Add to that the difficulty in finding evidence to show an ex-
ecutive had the requisite intent for a criminal offense. Voicing
the demand for retribution for perceived corporate malfeasance
overlooks just how difficult it can be to obtain a criminal convic-
tion.
One of the grounds for the claimed overcriminalization is the
broad discretion given to unaccountable prosecutors to decide
whether to file criminal charges, often without any transparency
about the reasons for that decision. At the same time, the oft-
heard criticism of the DOJ that it has not pursued any signature
cases against Wall Street chieftains may be rationalized as an
45 See In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.").
46 George Packer, A Dirty Business, The New Yorker 42, 51 (June 27, 2011).
47 See Michael Rothfeld and Chad Bray, Loss Raises Questions over Defense Strategy,
Wall St J Cl (May 13, 2011) ("Mr. Rajaratnam is estimated to have paid as much as $40
million for his defense, according to people familiar with the matter and some lawyers not
affiliated with the case, about two-thirds of the amount prosecutors said Galleon made
from the insider trading addressed in the charges.").
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exercise of that discretion. It could be that prosecutors do not
have enough to establish that statements were misleading or
false, and have chosen not to pursue cases based on what may be
equivocal evidence of intent even if false information was dissem-
inated. The problem with this explanation, of course, is that it
conflicts with the conclusion in the media that crimes must have
taken place for that much money to have been lost, and that the
perpetrators have escaped being called to account for their mis-
deeds. So there is a search for deeper reasons, which helps foster
theories claiming that Wall Street actually controls the govern-
ment and prevents cases from being pursued. The Financial Cri-
sis Inquiry Commission, charged with writing the historical rec-
ord about the causes of the financial crisis in 2008, could not
even issue a single report; instead, the Commission issued mul-
tiple reports, which together pointed to a wide range of causes,
from financial derivatives to insufficient regulatory oversight by
the federal government. A majority of the Commission "conclud-
ed that this crisis was avoidable. It found widespread failures in
financial regulation; dramatic breakdowns in corporate govern-
ance; excessive borrowing and risk-taking by households and
Wall Street; policy makers who were ill-prepared for the crisis;
and systemic breaches in accountability and ethics at all lev-
els."4 8 Three dissenting members "identified ten causes that are
essential to explaining the crisis."49 When everyone is responsible
for the problem, then no one is, which makes pursuing a criminal
case for conduct that fed the financial crisis all the more difficult.
Will we see the type of prosecution that would make some-
one the "face" of the financial crisis, in much the way that Ivan
48 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report xv (GPO
2011).
49 Id at 413. The dissent stated:
Not everything that went wrong during the financial crisis caused the crisis,
and while some causes were essential, others had only a minor impact. Not eve-
ry regulatory change related to housing or the financial system prior to the cri-
sis was a cause. The majority's almost 550-page report is more an account of
bad events than a focused explanation of what happened and why. When every-
thing is important, nothing is.
As an example, non-credit derivatives did not in any meaningful way cause or
contribute to the financial crisis. Neither the Community Reinvestment Act nor
removal of the Glass-Steagall firewall was a significant cause. The crisis can be
explained without resorting to these factors.
We also reject as too simplistic the hypothesis that too little regulation caused
the crisis, as well as its opposite, that too much regulation caused the crisis.
Id.
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Boesky came to symbolize insider trading in the 1980s and CEOs
like Jeffrey Skilling and Bernie Ebbers represented the corporate
accounting gimmicks used to inflate earnings that helped feed
the market bubble at the turn of the century? The problem with
any such symbol is that the person was not truly responsible for
all that can be assailed as wrong at a particular point in time.
Beyond that, though, is the perception that so many different
causes have been identified for the financial meltdown that any-
one charged with a crime can plausibly claim any financial diffi-
culties experienced by a company were largely attributable to
outside market forces. I think it is unlikely that any corporate
executives will be charged for crimes related to how they man-
aged (or mismanaged) companies and dealt with investors in the
months leading up to the financial crisis. The reason for the ab-
sence of any high-profile prosecutions of Wall Street executives
should not reflexively be attributed to investigators and prosecu-
tors failing to do their jobs diligently. The better answer could
well be that they did their jobs, and decided the evidence was
insufficient to prove a criminal violation. While an acquittal vin-
dicates a defendant, the cost from a prosecution goes far beyond
just the verdict. So the absence of criminal prosecutions target-
ing Wall Street executives may well show that prosecutors are
doing their jobs, and even supports the proposition that the mal-
ady of overcriminalization may be recognized by prosecutors in
the DOJ through their apparent decision to hold off on pursuing
the types of "show trials" that can be viewed as pandering to the
public thirst for what Secretary of the Treasury Timothy
Geithner called "Old Testament justice."50
II. OVERCRIMINALIZATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
CORPORATE PROSECUTION
While "overcriminalization" is often used as the explanation
for what is wrong in the American criminal justice system, it is
clear that it is not a term of art defining any one manifestation of
the ills that afflict the criminal law. Professor Brown described it
as "the term that captures the normative claim that governments
create too many crimes and criminalize things that properly
should not be crimes."5' The critique that there is overcriminali-
zation appears to be used more as a placeholder to describe how
50 See Joshua Green, Inside Man, The Atlantic 36, 48 (Apr 2010).
51 Brown, 7 J L Econ & Pol at 657 (cited in note 3).
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the criminal law has expanded so that there are too many de-
fendants being prosecuted and incarcerated, sometimes for sig-
nificant periods of time. The determination of what constitutes
the "over" part of the term seems to be the driver of the analysis
that the criminalization of more conduct has moved beyond the
norm, whatever that might be. One definition of "over" is "in ex-
cess of," but when the excess point was reached appears to be
more of a visceral reaction that whatever was once enough is now
too much, hence overcriminalization. What might be an accepta-
ble level of criminalization, however, usually is not described,
although perhaps there was once an idyllic period when the crim-
inal law was in equipoise. Despite the imprecision of the term, or
perhaps because of it, the issue has been described in almost
apocalyptic language. Professor Sanford Kadish's 1967 article
The Crisis of Overcriminalization discussed "rampant overcrimi-
nalization,"52 while the Heritage Foundation today maintains a
website named Overcriminalized.com. Professor Douglas Husak's
book Overcriminalization begins with the proposition that "the
most pressing problem with the criminal law today is that we
have too much of it."53 Others assert that "[tihere is broad
agreement in the legal community that the justice system is al-
ready severely overcriminalized."6
There are a range of reasons offered for the continuing trend
of overcriminalization, with much of the blame placed on legisla-
tures and prosecutors. Professor William Stuntz noted, "for the
past generation, virtually everyone who has written about feder-
52 Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 Annals Am Acad Pol &
Soc Sci 157, 158 (1967).
5 Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law 3 (Oxford
2008).
54 Bryan H. Druzin and Jessica Li, The Criminalization of Lying: Under What Cir-
cumstances, If Any, Should Lies Be Made Criminal?, 101 J Crim L & Criminology 529,
553 (2011). According to a Heritage Foundation report, "[tihe number of criminal offenses
in the US Code increased from 3,000 in the early 1980s to 4,000 by 2000 to over 4,450 by
2008." Overcriminalization: An Explosion of Federal Criminal Law, Fact Sheet No 86
(The Heritage Foundation Apr 27, 2011), online at http://www.heritage.org/research/fact
sheets/2011/04/overcriminalization-an-explosion-of-federal-criminal-law (visited Sept 10,
2012). Shortly after the acquittal of Casey Anthony on homicide charges related to the
death of her two-year-old daughter, Caylee, bills were introduced in a number of states
and in Congress to enact "Caylee's Law." See, for example, Caylee Anthony Caregiver
Responsibility Act of 2011, HR 2716, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (Aug 1, 2011); Marisa Kendall,
"Caylee's Law" Gains Steam with Florida Lawmakers, Fort Myers News-Press Al (July 8,
2011); John Timpane, Maya Rao, and Amy Worden, Fueled by Verdict Anger, Push for
"Caylee's Law" Starts in Pa, NJ, Philadelphia Inquirer AO1 (July 8, 2011). This new pro-
vision would make it a crime for parents and guardians to fail to report a missing child to
the police, creating yet another new law that would be on the books to address a fairly
uncommon, if quite tragic, occurrence.
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al criminal law has bemoaned its expansion. But the expansion
has continued apace, under very different sorts of Congresses
and Presidents."55 He argued that the reason for increased en-
actment of criminal provisions is more than just the political
gain to legislators from adopting more and broader criminal
laws, that "the story of American criminal law is a story of tacit
cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, each of whom
benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginali-
zation of judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability
rules rather than broad ones."56
A quasi-conspiracy theory perhaps, at least at the federal
level, is offered to explain why the clamor about overcriminaliza-
tion has been ignored, further demonstrated by the addition of
approximately 450 new criminal laws in just the last decade.5 7
Some commentators have directed attention to the broad discre-
tion held by prosecutors, who determine what offenses to charge
and, at least in the view of some, effectively establish the likely
punishment through those decisions. Professor Donald A. Dripps
noted that one method to constrain prosecutorial discretion
would look "to administrative law, where agencies entrusted
with vast discretion are checked by procedural requirements of
transparency and accountability."58
Incremental strategies have been offered to make it more
difficult to convict defendants, thereby retarding overcriminali-
zation as a byproduct, although the current level of criminal laws
would not be diminished. These proposals include a suggestion
that legislatures incorporate in all criminal statutes an express
mens rea element to eliminate strict liability offenses-or their
functional equivalent like "responsible corporate officer" liabil-
ity-and implement a corporate compliance defense for business
organizations accused of wrongdoing. If it is more difficult to
convict a defendant, particularly a corporation, then perhaps the
tide of overcriminalization will be slowed.
51 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich L Rev 505,
508 (2001).
56 Id at 510.
5 See John Baker, Revisiting the Explosive Growth of Federal Crimes, Legal Memo-
randum No 26 (The Heritage Foundation June 16, 2008), online at http://www.heritage.
org/research/reports/2008/06/revisiting-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crimes (visited
Sept 10, 2012).
58 Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible
Exit Strategies, 109 Pa St L Rev 1155, 1174 (2005).
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These are not necessarily significant impediments to the ex-
pansion of the criminal law, because a legislature can easily en-
act a statute with a very low intent level, such as negligence, and
a corporate compliance defense will only affect a very small
number of cases, even though they garner significant attention
from the financial press. Criticism of corporate criminal liability
has been particularly acute of late, focusing on the broad author-
ity of prosecutors to almost coerce companies into agreeing to
terms to conclude an investigation.5 9 Corporations are held re-
sponsible for criminal violations under the respondeat superior
theory, so that any misconduct by a corporate employee during
the course of the person's actions on behalf of the organization
can be attributed to it so long as there is at least some theoretical
benefit to the company.60 Corporations are risk-averse in this
area and are perceived as willing-perhaps too much so-to con-
cede violations in order to resolve an investigation through pay-
ment of a fine and, perhaps, accepting an outside monitor.
Professor Miriam Baer pointed out that, because prosecutors
wield enormous power over the decision whether to pursue crim-
inal charges since corporate criminal liability is so easy to estab-
lish, they may care little for the costs that will be imposed on a
company's shareholders when it must undertake remedial
measures as part of a plea agreement or deferred prosecution
agreement.6' Similarly, Professor Albert Alschuler explained that
5 See Dick Thornburgh, The Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real
Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial Entities and Artificial Crimes, 44 Am Crim L Rev
1279, 1283 (2007).
So if a company does not want to fight the case and potentially suffer an Arthur
Andersen demise, what does it do? The former head of the Enron Task Force
stated that because of what happened to Arthur Andersen, companies are far
more inclined to seek deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution
agreements. The examples of such agreements are now more and more common,
but at what cost?
Id. See also John Hasnas, The Significant Meaninglessness of Arthur Andersen LLP v.
United States, 2004-2005 Cato S Ct Rev 187, 211 (2004) ("[The courts have created an
inescapably strict form of corporate criminal liability in order to permit the resource-
effective prosecution of white collar offenses. But in doing so, they have invested federal
prosecutors with vast powers to coerce desired behavior from corporations with the threat
of criminal indictment.").
60 See Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Criminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46
Am Crim L Rev 1437, 1441 (2009) ("[A] corporation may effectively be held criminally
liable whenever one of its agents (or an independent contractor in some instances) com-
mits a crime related in almost any way to the agent's employment.").
61 Miriam H. Baer, Organizational Liability and the Tension between Corporate and
Criminal Law, 19 J L & Pol 1, 11 (2010). Baer explained that respondeat superior liabil-
ity "leaves corporations entirely dependent on unaccountable, highly powerful govern-
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executives may want to have the company take the blame for
misconduct in order to shield themselves, so that corporate crim-
inal liability "creates acute conflicts of interest for corporate
managers while affording enormous bargaining power to the
government."62 Preet Bharara, before he became the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, ques-
tioned the scope of corporate criminal liability, stating that
"courts, commentators, and practitioners should more seriously
consider the connection between the overbroad corporate crimi-
nal liability rule and the risk of overreaching by prosecutors who
use their legally-conferred blank check to ferret out corporate
crime."63 Prosecution of individual corporate employees for the
acts of others under responsible corporate officer provisions has
also been questioned. The Supreme Court first recognized the
propriety of holding a corporate executive responsible for the acts
of the company in United States v Dotterweich64 when it reasoned
that "[h]ardship there doubtless may be under a statute which
thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdo-
ing be totally wanting."6 5 In United States v Park,66 the Court
confirmed the scope of Dotterweich as imposing liability on corpo-
rate officials without regard to their intent,67 explaining:
The requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on
responsible corporate agents are beyond question de-
manding, and perhaps onerous, but they are no more
stringent than the public has a right to expect of those
who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises whose services and products affect the health
and well-being of the public that supports them.6 8
Dotterweich and Park involved violations of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, which prohibits the sale of "adul-
terated or misbranded" products in interstate commerce.69 Both
ment actors who have their own personal and institutional interests. It is this very lack of
accountability that creates the possibility for waste and abuse, the costs of which ulti-
mately fall upon corporate shareholders." Id.
62 Alschuler, 46 Am Crim L Rev at 1372 (cited in note 6).
63 Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 Am Crim L Rev 53, 56 (2007).
64 320 US 277 (1943).
65 Id at 284.
66 421 US 658 (1975).
67 Id at 670.
68 Id at 672.
69 See 21 USC § 331(k). This section states:
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the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act include "any respon-
sible corporate officer" within the definition of "persons" whose
conduct can violate the laws for failing to prevent violations. 70 In
United States v Iverson,71 the Ninth Circuit explained that a re-
sponsible corporate officer is "'any corporate officer' who is 'an-
swerable' or 'accountable' for the unlawful discharge" in violation
of the Clean Water Act. 7 2 Importantly, officials can be prosecuted
solely for the conduct of others, with no need to establish that
they undertook to violate the law of their own accord but only
failed to prevent or correct a violation. 73 One author suggested
that imposing liability on an individual through the responsible
corporate officer doctrine "is often unfair and counterproduc-
tive."74
The concern with prosecutorial discretion is clearly a legiti-
mate one, especially in the context of plea bargaining, in which
the power of the prosecutor to pile on charges carrying substan-
tial penalties makes it almost impossible for an individual to re-
sist an offer in the face of a significant term of incarceration. The
Supreme Court has placed few real limits on how the govern-
ment can threaten a defendant with additional charges, effective-
ly creating a "free-fire zone" for plea bargaining.75 For corpora-
The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or
any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food,
drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale
(whether or not the first sale) after shipment in interstate commerce and re-
sults in such article being adulterated or misbranded.
Id.
70 See 33 USC § 1319(c)(6) ("For the purpose of this subsection, the term 'person'
means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362 (5) of this title, any respon-
sible corporate officer."). For identical language, see also 42 USC § 7413(c)(6). The gov-
ernment must prove a defendant's knowledge for a violation, but there is no need to es-
tablish any additional conduct by the person charged as the "responsible corporate of-
ficer" beyond that required for a violation.
71 162 F3d 1015 (9th Cir 1998).
72 Id at 1023.
7 See Lisa Litwiller, From Exxon to Engle: The Futility of Assessing Punitive Dam-
ages As Against Corporate Entities, 57 Rutgers L Rev 301, 337 (2004).
What is so controversial and intriguing about the RCO (Responsible Corporate
Officer doctrine] is the fact that criminal liability for an act may be imposed on
a corporate officer despite the fact that the officer himself did not commit the
act directly. Even more surprising is that, for liability to be imposed, the officer
need not have intended that the act actually be committed.
Id.
7 David C. Fortney, Note, Thinking Outside the 'Black Box" Tailored Enforcement
in Environmental Criminal Law, 81 Tex L Rev 1609, 1631 (2003).
75 In Bordenkircher v Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978), the Supreme Court stated that "in
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tions, bargaining is viewed as even more one-sided than for many
individual defendants because an organization can be convicted
based solely on its vicarious liability for the act of any employee
that constitutes a violation. The impact of a conviction can be
significant for companies operating in certain industries or sec-
tors, with the oft-cited example of Arthur Andersen's demise af-
ter its conviction as proof that no corporation dare fight charg-
es. 76 Although the picture of the overwhelmed corporation cower-
ing in the prosecutor's wake is not nearly as one-sided as it is
sometimes portrayed, a criminal conviction can have substantial
consequences for an organization that reverberate far beyond
those directly responsible for the misconduct. In response, prose-
cutors today resort to deferred and non-prosecution agreements
the 'give-and-take' of plea bargaining, there is no such element of punishment or retalia-
tion so long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer." Id at 363.
The power of prosecutors to "negotiate" plea agreements by threatening additional charg-
es if a defendant sought to exercise the right to trial was not a problem according to the
Court because, "by tolerating and encouraging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has
necessarily accepted as constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's
interest at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead
not guilty." Id at 364. The likelihood of reforming the system of plea bargaining, when
such agreements resolve around 80 to 90 percent of criminal cases in most jurisdictions,
appears to be quite low. See Alexandra W. Reimelt, Note, An Unjust Bargain: Plea Bar-
gains and Waiver of Right to Appeal, 51 BC L Rev 871, 873 (2010) ("The U.S. Supreme
Court has estimated that at least ninety percent of criminal convictions are based on
guilty pleas."), citing Brady v US, 397 US 742, 752 n 10 (1970). As with recommendations
for how the legislatures should draft laws, most proposals regarding plea bargaining offer
rather modest incremental changes. Yet some scholars have expressed a need to regulate
plea bargaining. See, for example, Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining
Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal L Rev 1117, 1120-21 (2011)
("Since the criminal process is far too complicated and opaque to leave defendants at the
mercy of caveat emptor, it is time to consider regulations modeled on consumer protection
law."); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U Pa L
Rev 439, 441 (1971) ("Accepting the premise that prosecutorial encouragement of guilty
pleas is a necessary feature of our present system of justice, it is important to formulate
guidelines which retain the advantages yet minimize the undesirable consequences of
plea bargaining."). Calls for more radical reformation of the system to provide defendants
with the resources to fully defend a case and have courts to conduct trials in most prose-
cutions run into the rather persistent problem of inadequate resources to fund such an
agenda.
76 The view that corporations will never go to trial is not entirely accurate, but has
become the accepted wisdom. See Peter J. Henning, Corporate Criminal Liability and the
Potential for Rehabilitation, 46 Am Crim L Rev 1417, 1418-19 (2009).
The demise of Arthur Andersen after its conviction in 2002 for obstruction of
justice is often used to "prove" the purported overwhelming power of prosecu-
tors and the trembling fear of corporations who dare not risk going to trial un-
der any circumstances lest they face near-certain destruction. However, there
have been no other instances of a large firm suffering the same fate since then,
even though other companies that have been charged with crimes and appear to
have survived the ordeal, albeit quite a bit worse for wear.
Id.
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with companies to resolve criminal cases in order to mitigate
some of the collateral consequences of a prosecution, using them
more as a type of administrative remedy than a criminal pun-
ishment.77 This avoids some of the collateral consequences of a
conviction, which is one of the points of the overcriminalization
critique regarding the application of penal sanctions to organiza-
tions.78
The focus on overcriminalization shows that further expan-
sion of the criminal law should be a last resort rather than the
first option in responding to a financial crisis. That does not
mean the legislatures should not enact new laws, but it raises
the question of whether there is a legitimate need for additional
penal provisions to address what is perceived as the misconduct
that led to the financial crisis in 2008. There are already broad
antifraud provisionS79 and financial and accounting reporting
laws in place80 that do not focus on the content of a business de-
cision but its transparency and the communication of truthful
information. Identifying specific business judgments as criminal,
based on their riskiness or potential impact on the broader econ-
omy, risks dragging the government into the sphere of private
decision making regarding the proper allocation of corporate re-
sources and investments.
It may be possible to craft new provisions that make it a
crime for a corporation and its executives to engage in risky fi-
nancial activities, but it is difficult to imagine how those laws
would not be so broad that almost any poor business decision
7 See Peter Spivack and Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current
Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 Am Crim L Rev 159, 161 (2008) ("By fo-
cusing more on prospective questions of corporate governance and compliance, and less on
the retrospective question of the entity's criminal liability, federal prosecutors have fash-
ioned a new role for themselves in policing, and supervising, corporate America. They
have become the New Regulators.").
78 James W. Harlow, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: A Statutory Frame-
work, 61 Duke L J 123, 142 (2011) ("A more forceful critique of corporate criminal liability
is that convicted corporations may face collateral debarment or delicensing proceedings
that jeopardize the corporate existence, even if the criminal sanctions themselves are
minimal.").
7 See, for example, 15 USCA § 78j(b) (making it unlawful for any person "to use or
employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, or any securities-based swap
agreement (as defined in section 206B of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance").
so See, for example, 15 USC § 78m(b)(2)(A) (requiring corporations with securities
registered with the SEC to "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in rea-
sonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets
of the issuer").
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could be the subject of a criminal prosecution. As academic critics
of the criminal law have argued, simply enacting more laws with
the goal of making it easier to punish executives for perceived
misconduct at their companies would be a problematic expansion
of the criminal law because the net effect would be to create a
crime for engaging in questionable business practices or tolerat-
ing a corporate culture that encourages overly risky behavior-in
other words, stupidity would become a federal offense. And if
such new criminal provisions were enacted, questions could be
raised regarding whether it would be fair to limit them to corpo-
rate executives because many individuals made poor choices re-
garding the level of debt they could manage that also contributed
to the financial problems suffered.
While there has been a broad, visceral reaction to the finan-
cial meltdown in 2008, to have someone held accountable for the
severe disruptions to the housing and job markets, using the
criminal law as the means to impose accountability on execu-
tives, is not tenable absent proof that individuals had the requi-
site mens rea to violate already broad federal statutes. If asked
whether there is a need for new criminal laws to permit prosecu-
tors to pursue cases against executives for the type of conduct
they engaged in during the financial meltdown, a fair response
would ask what areas prone to corporate misconduct are not al-
ready addressed. It is unclear that laws on the books are not ef-
fective in dealing with the alleged frauds on the road to the fi-
nancial meltdown, and simply asserting that the lack of prosecu-
tions shows the inadequacy of the criminal law ignores the real
possibility that mismanagement, not criminal designs, was the
primary factor in the financial maelstrom in 2008.
III. CREATING THE POWER TO REMOVE EXECUTIVES FOR
CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
In light of the discussion regarding overcriminalization, ad-
ministrative remedies may be a more efficacious way to address
the issue of executive accountability for corporate misconduct.
Using the regulatory system has the benefit of allowing for a
much broader range of conduct to be subjected to remedial
measures because liability would not depend on meeting the due
process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt other-
wise necessary for a criminal conviction. Civil enforcement would
not require an expansive description of the actus reus of an of-
fense or the elimination of the mens rea element that could re-
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sult in the imposition of criminal punishment based on mere neg-
ligence, or even strict liability.
Yet, an administrative action does not have the same stig-
matizing effect of a criminal conviction, nor is it an expression of
communal moral outrage at a defendant's conduct that is reflect-
ed in the factual determination that a defendant is a "criminal."
For those who want to see an executive carted off to jail, the civil
route may be unsatisfying, and perhaps could even enhance the
view of inequality between the rich and powerful and the other
99 percent. But if the goal is to find a means to enhance the ac-
countability of executives for corporate misconduct, then it seems
clear that expanding criminal liability by lowering the mens rea
element should not be used because it would debase the basic
principles of criminal responsibility that limit a person's liability
to his own intentional conduct. As Professor Brown noted, "[t]he
fundamentally instrumental goals of regulation can be over-
whelmingly achieved with civil and administrative mechanisms,
thereby holding criminal law in reserve for culpable, substantial-
ly harmful wrongdoing."8
As is true in any large business, there are layers of subordi-
nate managers directly responsible for day-to-day operations who
are more likely to engage in the wide variety of conduct that can
trigger corporate criminal liability-ranging from environmental
discharges to false reporting of business transactions to authoriz-
ing payments to foreign officials. Lower-level employees may feel
pressure to reach the corporation's sales or profit goals by any
means available, to dispose of waste in the least expensive way,
or to secure completion of an overseas project by obtaining the
cooperation of foreign ministry officials, but senior executives can
truthfully proclaim both their ignorance and abhorrence of mis-
conduct. The oft-voiced complaint about the difficulty in holding
senior executives accountable is that they are largely insulated
from day-to-day wrongdoing within the organization. Pursuing a
criminal prosecution against them is nearly impossible because
of their lack of direct involvement in any corporate violations.
While a chief executive may proclaim his or her responsibility for
everything that happens in the company-"the buck stops here"
being the catchphrase of choice in most instances-simply hold-
ing a leadership position does not make one liable for crimes
committed by others within an organization. 2
81 Brown, 7 J L Econ & Pol at 681 (cited in note 3).
82 Professors Claire Hill and Richard Painter have suggested that senior executives
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Even when apparent misconduct occurs that would seem to
come within the purview of senior management, executives may
be able to assert their reliance on others and claim they did not
pay attention to the mundane financial details that are so crucial
to proving fraud. For example, prior to its collapse into the larg-
est bankruptcy in American history, Lehman Brothers engaged
in a series of repurchase transactions, called "Repo 105," at the
end of each quarter to temporarily move debt away from the
company so that it appeared to have much less leverage on its
balance sheet, an important metric to Wall Street. The transac-
tions were then reversed shortly after the new quarter began,
but they complied with the technical requirements of the ac-
counting rules then in effect, although the firm had to get a Lon-
don-based law firm to bless the transaction because apparently
no United States lawyers would give an opinion approving
them.83 In its last quarter before declaring bankruptcy, the Repo
at financial firms who engage in risky investment strategies should be required to per-
sonally guarantee the firm's debt in order to enhance their accountability. They ex-
plained:
We cannot bring back the old investment banking partnerships, and most in-
vestment banks will continue to be public companies. We can, however, require
the most highly paid executives in these firms to personally guarantee the debts
of their firms in return for their high salaries and bonuses, or pay them with
stock that is subject to a cash assessment if the firm gets into trouble and be-
comes insolvent.
Bank boards of directors-perhaps at the urging of shareholders and creditors-
should require this. If not, bank regulators should consider imposing some
measure of personal liability on the most highly paid executives of banks that
fail.
Claire A. Hill and Richard W. Painter, Another View: A Simpler Rein Than the Volcker
Rule, NY Times DealBook Blog (NY Times Oct 28, 2011), online at http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2011/10/28/another-view-a-simpler-rein-than-the-volcker-rule/ (visited Sept
10, 2012). See generally Claire Hill and Richard Painter, Berle's Vision Beyond Share-
holder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33
Seattle U L Rev 1173 (2010).
83 See Michael J. De La Merced and Julia Werdigier, The Origins of Lehman's 'Repo
105', NY Times DealBook Blog (NY Times Mar 12, 2010), online at http://dealbook.
nytimes.com/2010/03/12/the-british-origins-of-lehmans-accounting-gimmick/ (visited Sept
10, 2012). De La Merced and Werdigier explain:
When Lehman first designed Repo 105 in 2001, however, there was one catch.
The firm couldn't get any American law firms to sign off on the aggressive ac-
counting, namely that these transactions were true sales instead of what
amounted to the parking of assets.... Enter Linklaters, which grounded its le-
gal brief in English, rather than American, law.
Id.
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105 transactions moved upwards of fifty billion dollars off of
Lehman's balance sheet, a sizeable amount for any company. 84
A bankruptcy examiner concluded that the Repo 105 trades
were potentially misleading to investors, but Richard S. Fuld Jr,
the firm's former CEO, proclaimed his ignorance of the entire set
of financial machinations, asserting that he relied on others to
deal with such things.85 Neither the DOJ nor the SEC has filed
charges against any former Lehman officers for the Repo 105
transactions-or anything else for that matter-and the firm's
bankruptcy means the government will not pursue an action
against it because to do so would be fruitless.
The SEC can seek to have an executive barred from serving
as an officer or director of a company that has issued publicly
traded securities, although this remedy is only available when a
defendant has been found to have violated the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws, most prominently § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.86 Thus, the bar is limited to those instances in which
the executive personally engaged in serious misconduct, and it is
an adjunct to the range of remedies available, such as disgorge-
ment of ill-gotten gains and civil penalties that can range as high
as $500,000 for each violation.87 To seek a bar on Lehman execu-
tives or any Wall Street firm for actions taken during the finan-
84 See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U Colo L Rev 167, 170 n 5 (2011) ("Lehman Brothers' filing noted that the
firm had, at the time of its filing, debts in the amount of approximately $613 billion.").
85 See Cyrus Sanati, Lehman Examiner: Fuld Probably Knew of Repo 105, NY Times
DealBook Blog (NY Times Apr 20, 2010), online at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2OlO/04/
20/lehman-examiner-fuld-probably-knew-of-repo-105/ (visited Sept 10, 2012) (indicating
that "Mr. Fuld denied knowing about the accounting technique").
86 Section 10(b) provides:
[T]he court may prohibit, conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or
for such period of time as it shall determine, any person who violated section
78j(b) of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder from acting as an of-
ficer or director of any issuer that has a class of securities registered pursuant
to section 781 of this title or that is required to file reports pursuant to sec-
tion 78o(d) of this title if the person's conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve
as an officer or director of any such issuer.
15 USC § 78u(d)(2). The Securities Act of 1933 has an identical provision for violations of
§ 17(a). See 15 USC § 77t(e). A violation of § 17(a)(2) and (3) only requires proof of negli-
gence, while violations of § 17(a)(1) and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act require
proof of scienter. Compare 15 USC § 77t(e), with 15 USC § 78u(d)(2).
87 See 15 USC § 78u-2(b). Civil monetary penalties can be imposed from $5,000 per
violation up to $500,000 if it involved "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reck-
less disregard of a regulatory requirement" and caused a substantial risk of loss or pecu-
niary gain. 15 USC § 78u-2(b)(1)-(3).
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cial meltdown, the SEC would have to prove fraud, something it
has thus far only attempted once.88 While the bar could be a
means to police corporate executives by removing them from of-
fice and precluding future appointments, it requires a substan-
tial showing of personal misconduct by the officer, which is not
often seen.
The director and officer bar is not the only means available
to the SEC to hold executives responsible for corporate miscon-
duct. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC
to claw back a portion of the incentive-based or equity compensa-
tion paid out to the chief executive and chief financial officer if
the company "is required to prepare an accounting restatement
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a result of
misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement under the
securities laws."89 In SEC v Jenkins,90 a district court rejected
the argument of the former CEO of a company, which had re-
stated its financials due to accounting fraud in which he had no
involvement, that the SEC could not seek to reclaim his compen-
sation because he did not personally engage in the violations.91
The court held that "the text and structure of Section 304 require
only the misconduct of the issuer, but do not necessarily require
the specific misconduct of the issuer's CEO or CFO."92 Similarly,
88 The SEC filed a civil fraud action against Goldman Sachs related to its actions in
constructing and marketing a collateralized debt obligation in 2007 that resulted in an
almost complete loss to the investors, and the firm paid a $550 million penalty, although
it disclaimed having violated the antifraud laws while admitting it made "mistakes" in
how it marketed the security. The only individual defendant sued was Fabrice Tourre, a
low-level employee who was unlikely to ever rise to a position of any prominence in the
firm. See SEC v Goldman Sachs & Co, 790 F Supp 2d 147, 149-50 (SDNY 2011).
89 15 USC § 7243(a). The amount that can be recovered is limited to the compensa-
tion received in the year before the financial restatement. See id. The Dodd-Frank Act
requires public companies to claw back from their executives up to three years of incen-
tive-based compensation if there is a restatement of its financial statements as a result of
"material noncompliance" with accounting requirements. See 15 USC § 78j-4(b). This
would be a private action by the corporation against its executives rather than a public
enforcement action by a federal agency.
9o 718 F Supp 2d 1070 (D Ariz 2010).
91 Id at 1075.
92 Id at 1074. The former CEO settled the SEC's claim by agreeing to repay to the
company approximately $2.8 million in bonus compensation and stock profits that he
received while the accounting fraud occurred. See SEC, Press Release, Former CEO to
Return $2.8 Million in Bonuses and Stock Profits Received during CSK Auto Accounting
Fraud (Nov 15, 2011), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-243.htm (visit-
ed Sept 10, 2012). The SEC also settled a clawback claim for approximately $1.4 million
with the former chief financial officer of Beazer Homes USA, Inc, who was in charge while
the company engaged in an accounting fraud, although he was not accused of being in-
volved in it. See SEC v James O'Leary, Litigation Release No 22074 (SEC Aug 30, 2011),
online at http: //www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/201 1/lr22074.htm (visited Sept 10,
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the Second Circuit rejected a settlement agreement in a share-
holder derivative action alleging fraud by a company that con-
tained a provision requiring the corporation to reimburse its
CEO and CFO for any payments that might be ordered, finding
that after the enactment of § 304, indemnifying those costs
"[flies] in the face of Congress's efforts to make high ranking cor-
porate officers of public companies directly responsible for their
actions that have caused material noncompliance with financial
reporting requirements." 93
Like the SEC's authority to bar directors and officers, the
executive compensation clawback provision applies to a limited
range of cases. The trigger for a clawback is a restatement of a
company's financial statements, which will only arise when there
is a material misstatement of a company's books and records. In
2010, there were 735 restatements, and not every one involved
misconduct that would trigger a clawback.94 A wide array of cor-
porate misconduct, such as environmental violations, does not
necessarily implicate a company's financial statements, and so
would not trigger a clawback.
Despite its narrow trigger for liability, § 304 is a worthwhile
provision that puts the pocketbooks of executives on the line,
even though it may not be viewed as significantly enhancing the
accountability of corporate management. The provision shows
that personal involvement in corporate misconduct is not a nec-
essary prerequisite to penalizing senior executives, imposing
managerial accountability for the violations of others based on
the person's position in the organization. 95
Other federal agencies can hold executives responsible for
corporate misconduct without requiring direct involvement. The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has the authority
to seek to suspend or remove a director or officer of a bank if the
person "engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound prac-
tice" or breached a fiduciary duty that meant the bank "has suf-
fered or will probably suffer financial loss or other damage" and
2012).
9 Cohen v Viray, 622 F3d 188, 195 (2d Cir 2010).
94 See Mark Cheffers, Don Whalen, and Olga Uavyatsky, 2010 Financial Restate-
ments: A Ten Year Comparison, 3 (Audit Analytics May 2011), online at http: /media.
complianceweek.comldocuments/23/2010restatement_5709.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
95 See SEC v Microtune, Inc, 783 F Supp 2d 867, 887 (ND Tex 2011) ("Section 304
requires reimbursement of all stock profits and bonuses received within a twelve-month
period after specified filings. This absence of a link between the amount of reimburse-
ment and the actual harm caused by the defendant weighs in favor of characterizing
Section 304's reimbursement remedy as a penalty.") (emphasis in original).
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the executive or director's conduct involves dishonesty or shows a
"willful or continuing disregard" for the bank's safety and sound-
ness. 96 Any person subject to such an order receives an industry-
wide bar on participating in the affairs of any other bank or cred-
it union,97 so an executive or director cannot move on to a new
institution if there is a removal or suspension order in place.
Conduct that could jeopardize a bank's safety and soundness in-
cludes transactions that create an abnormal risk of loss, or deci-
sions that may lead to a bank's insolvency or significant dissipa-
tion of its assets.98 For example, courts have found that conduct
jeopardized a bank's safety and soundness based on paying ex-
cessive salaries,99 making loans to a controlling shareholder 00 or
to borrowers who would simply relend the money to an entity
unable to secure additional credit from the bank,101 and releasing
a borrower's guaranties with no substantial benefit to the
bank.102
Banks are subject to substantial federal and state oversight
regarding every facet of their operations, from decisions on
where to open branches to capitalization and corporate structure
to extraordinary transactions. 1 0 3 Deposit insurance provided
9 12 USC § 1818(e)(1).
9 12 USC § 1818(e)(1). An order operates "to remove such party from office or to
prohibit any further participation by such party, in any manner, in the conduct of the
affairs of any insured depository institution."
9 See David G. Mayes and Geoffrey E. Wood, The Structure of Financial Regulation
169 n 4 (Routledge 2007), citing Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Hearings
on S 3158 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong, 2nd Sess
49-50 (1966) (memorandum submitted by John Horne) ("Horne Memorandum"). The
Congressional Hearing heard the following testimony:
[T]he term "unsafe or unsound practices" has a central meaning which can and
must be applied to constantly changing factual circumstances. Generally speak-
ing, an "unsafe or unsound practice" embraces any action, or lack of action,
which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the pos-
sible consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or
damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the in-
surance fund.
Horne Memorandum, 89th Cong, 2d Sess at 50.
9 See First National Bank of Eden, SD v Deptartment of the Treasury, 568 F2d 610,
611 (8th Cir 1978).
1oo See Groos National Bank v Comptroller of the Currency, 573 F2d 889, 897 (5th Cir
1978).
101 See Ulrich v US Department of Treasury, 129 Fed Appx 386, 389 (9th Cir 2005).
102 See Cavallari v Office of Comptroller of the Currency, 57 F3d 137, 143 (2d Cir
1995).
103 See Michael P. Malloy, Banking Law and Regulation § 1.1 at 1.3-1.4 (Aspen 2d ed
2011). According to Malloy:
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through the FDIC gives the federal government a particularly
strong interest in how banks are operated, so the safety and
soundness requirement goes beyond just focusing on illegal con-
duct. Issues of safety and soundness include decisions that create
substantial risks to the organization, its depositors, and the gov-
ernment insurance fund that would otherwise fall under the
business judgment rule employed in corporate law to insulate
day-to-day decisions of a corporate board from judicial review
absent gross negligence. 104 So governmental interference with
internal corporate governance, unknown in other industries, is
more nearly the standard for banks and related financial institu-
tions, which at this point include leading Wall Street firms like
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley that converted their status
in 2008 in order to receive federal bailout money through the
Troubled Asset Relief Program. 05
In the healthcare arena, the federal government uses exclu-
sion from further participation in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs as an important tool to deter fraud. A provision adopt-
ed in 1996 as part of the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act permits the Department of Health and Human
Services to exclude an "officer or managing employee" of a com-
pany found to have violated certain provisions of the healthcare
laws from further participation with the federal programs. 106
The degree of state and federal regulation is pervasive and thorough. To estab-
lish a corporation intended to enter the industry, to expand into other geograph-
ic or product markets, to merge with or acquire an existing entity within the in-
dustry, to recapitalize or otherwise reorganize the entity-each of these actions,
and virtually every other action undertaken by an entity within the industry, is
subject to regulatory oversight and often express approval of one or more of the
regulators, in considerable substantive detail. From birth to death, each step in
the corporate life of these entities is subject to regulation.
Id.
104 See In re Citigroup Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 964 A2d 106, 122 (Del Ch
2009) ('[D]irector action is analyzed under the business judgment rule, which prevents
judicial second guessing of the decision if the directors employed a rational process and
considered all material information reasonably available-a standard measured by con-
cepts of gross negligence.").
105 See Michael J. Moore, Goldman May Drop Bank Status over Volker Rule, Hilder
Says, Bloomberg Businessweek (Bloomberg Oct 12, 2011), online at http: /www.business
week.com/news/2011-10-12/goldman-may-drop-bank-status-over-volcker-rule-hilder-says.
html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
106 42 USC § 1320a-7(b)(15). The section provides that "[t]he Secretary may exclude
the following individuals and entities from participation in any Federal health care pro-
gram" for a violation. 42 USC § 1320a-7(b). The term "managing employee" has a very
broad definition, covering "an individual, including a general manager, business manag-
er, administrator, and director, who exercises operational or managerial control over the
entity, or who directly or indirectly conducts the day-to-day operations of the entity." 42
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There is no requirement that the employee be shown to have
played a role in the misconduct to trigger an action by the De-
partment. Exclusion means the person must be removed from
any role at the company because it would also be subject to ex-
clusion from the programs for retaining a violator. 107 An exclu-
sion order would effectively destroy any hospital, drug manufac-
turer, or equipment supplier because of the large amount of fed-
eral funding, used to purchase products and services, that would
no longer be available. The statute also allows for the exclusion
of anyone with a direct or indirect controlling interest in the
company, but that requires proof that the person knew or should
have known about the conduct underlying the violation, a re-
quirement that is not imposed on actions against corporate exec-
utives. The House Report on the statute states that it was adopt-
ed because "[t]he Committee felt that greater deterrence against
fraud and abuse was needed in the Medicare program."108
The Department of Health and Human Services has not yet
used this provision, and in only one instance did it notify a corpo-
rate executive that it was considering seeking his exclusion
based on the company's prior violations. 109 The company's re-
sponse was-not surprisingly-quite negative, asserting that
"[i]t would be completely unwarranted to exclude a senior execu-
tive against whom there has never been any allegation of wrong-
doing whatsoever."' 10 A few months later, the government
backed down, notifying the executive that it would not pursue his
exclusion any further.1 ' The claimed unfairness of potentially
excluding an executive for conduct by the company with which he
was not directly involved does not reflect the scope of the statute,
which authorizes actions against corporate officers without re-
USC § 1320a-5(b). The violations by the company include any "criminal offense consisting
of a felony relating to fraud, theft, embezzlement, breach of fiduciary responsibility, or
other financial misconduct." 42 USC § 1320a-7(a)(3). Those violations result in mandatory
exclusion from federal healthcare programs. 42 USC § 1320a-7(a).
107 42 USC § 1320a-7(b)(5).
1os Health Coverage Availability and Affordability Act of 1996, HR Rep No 104-496(I),
104th Cong, 2d Sess 88 (1996), reprinted in 1996 USCCAN 1865, 1888 (1996).
109 See Forest Laboratories, Inc, Press Release, Forest Laboratories Chairman and
CEO to Challenge "Unwarranted and Unprecedented" Potential Action to Exclude Him
from Federal Healthcare Programs (Apr 13, 2011), online at http: /news.frx.com/press-
release/corporate-news/forest-laboratories-chairman-and-ceo-challenge-unwarranted-and-
unpreced (visited Sept 10, 2012).
110 Id.
111 See Forest Laboratories, Inc, Press Release, HHS-OIG Drops Potential Action
against Forest CEO Howard Solomon (Aug 5, 2011), online at http://news.frx.com/press-
release/corporate-news/hhs-oig-drops-potential-action-against-forest-ceo-howard-solomon
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
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gard to their connection to illegal conduct. While a controlling
shareholder can only be excluded based on proof of the person's
knowledge or willful blindness, 112 executives can be excluded
from federal healthcare programs without regard to any in-
volvement or knowledge of the misconduct.
If there is a risk of exclusion from a corporate position for an
executive who fails to put in place measures to prevent violations
or who tolerates risky conduct that can lead to violations by low-
er-level employees, then deterrence can be served. It is clear that
Congress wants to see corporate executives in the banking and
healthcare areas subject to the threat of removal based on con-
duct of the company for which they have oversight responsibility.
The standard applied requires proof of a significant legal viola-
tion by the organization, but is not necessarily based on personal
involvement in the misconduct. A CEO and other senior execu-
tives have the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the com-
pany complies with the law, and they set the tone for the corpo-
rate culture. So while minor transgressions or conduct by a rogue
employee should not be attributed to the organization's leader-
ship, misconduct over a period of time or serious legal violations
that involve at least the implicit approval or willful blindness of
the top levels of management, ought to result in holding senior
executives responsible for tolerating a culture that allows-and
perhaps even encourages-corporate misconduct. While the ex-
ecutive would not be directly involved in the corporate miscon-
duct, the government should have to show that the person was at
least negligent in managing the company in order to be held re-
sponsible for its conduct. Accountability requires that an execu-
tive fail the company in some manner, not through active mis-
conduct but by failing to ensure it took steps necessary to pre-
vent persistent or significant misconduct and put in place the
type of corporate culture that minimizes the likelihood of viola-
tions.
The authority to remove executives in the banking and
healthcare areas provides a structure for expanding the SEC's
power to remove executives from companies in other industries,
such as investment banking and hedge funds. The FDIC and the
Department of Health and Human Services must show that the
112 The statute explains that "[t]he term 'should know' means that a person, with
respect to information (A) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the infor-
mation; or (B) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information, and no
proof of specific intent to defraud is required."42 USC § 1320a-7(a)(i)(7).
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company engaged in significant misconduct as a prerequisite to
any action against an individual executive. So while "safety and
soundness" for banking and fraud for healthcare are the primary
types of misconduct for removal of executives, a broader ap-
proach that cuts across industries would require proof of signifi-
cant corporate misconduct without specifying the particular laws
violated. For some companies, environmental laws might be the
most directly applicable, while for others, public health and safe-
ty provisions would apply. And there are a number of statutes
that are not specific to a particular line of business, such as the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,113 which prohibits bribery of for-
eign officials to obtain or retain business, the Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Act,114 and tax and securities laws.
The SEC already has the authority to bar officers and direc-
tors from serving in those positions in a publicly traded company
based on their violations of an antifraud provision, so that is the
logical place to add this authority. The Commission can pursue
this remedy in a federal district court injunctive action or by in-
stituting an administrative proceeding. In either forum, the bur-
den of proof is on the SEC to establish the significance of the cor-
porate violations that would trigger the bar, and standards for
why certain types of misconduct would be sufficient can be
adopted by rule to provide minimum criteria for invocation of the
bar. The current authority to bar executives requires proof of
scienter or negligence for specified fraud violations, and the SEC
should at least be required to show that the executive was negli-
gent in managing the company by allowing, or not preventing,
such misconduct within the organization." 5 The process for ad-
ministrative and judicial review is already in place, so due pro-
11s 15 USC § 78dd-1 et seq.
114 29 USC § 651 et seq.
115 The standard proposed here bears some similarities to the fiduciary duty to moni-
tor imposed on corporate directors under In re Caremark International Inc Derivative
Litigation, 698 A2d 959 (Del Ch 1996).
[A] director's obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board concludes is ade-
quate, exists, and that failure to do so under some circumstances may, in theory
at least, render a director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with appli-
cable legal standards.
Id at 970. The proposed ground to bar an executive is broader than the Caremark duty,
however, because it focuses on how the violations occurred within the corporation and
whether they were systematic, and not just whether there were monitoring systems in
place to inform the board. Caremark deals with a director's duty, while an executive has
responsibility for a company's day-to-day operations, so the issue should be whether that
authority was properly exercised to prevent or redress wrongdoing in the first instance.
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cess would be ensured as part of a proceeding requiring some
evidence that an executive did not act reasonably in leading the
company, despite not being directly involved in any violations. 116
The SEC's power to bar an executive only applies to corpora-
tions that have issued securities traded on the public markets,
which encompasses the vast majority of the larger companies
operating in the United States. For privately held firms that
could engage in significant misconduct, the SEC can be given
authority to bar executives of larger organizations based on the
value of the firm's assets and liabilities. The Financial Stability
Oversight Council, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, has proposed
a rule that would give the Federal Reserve oversight authority
over nonbank financial institutions that have over $50 billion in
assets and $20 billion in debt.117 Thus, even if the firm did not
issue publicly traded securities, such as a hedge fund, it would
still be subject to regulation, and so would be of sufficient im-
portance that its executives should also be made subject to po-
tential removal if the organization engages in significant mis-
conduct.
One problem with expanding the SEC's power to bar execu-
tives from serving in companies is that this interferes with in-
ternal corporate governance, under which shareholders and di-
rectors determine who should be responsible for the management
and oversight of the company. Enhancing federal power to dic-
tate who can lead a company means the right of a corporation to
determine its best interests will be diminished because a gov-
ernment agency may be able to decide what is best for the busi-
ness by dictating who is permitted to lead it.
This proposal would clearly enhance federal authority over
private enterprises, although it does not give the SEC authority
116 See 12 USC § 5382. Most cases involving a bar from serving as an officer or direc-
tor of a publicly traded company are the result of a settlement rather than a trial or ad-
ministrative proceeding. See, for example, SEC Settles Options Backdating Charges With
Former Apple General Counsel for $2.2 Million, Litigation Release No 20683 (SEC Aug 14
2008), online at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr2O683.htm (visited Sept
10, 2012) (describing the settlement agreement, which included two executives agreeing
to be barred from serving as an officer or a director); Frederick P. Garbriel Jr and Brude
Kelly, Reverse Spin: MFS Not Too Proud to Settle with SEC, Investment News 4 (Feb 9,
2004) (describing the settlement agreement which included two high-level MFS execu-
tives barred from serving as officers or directors of a fund management company for three
years). By expanding the SEC's authority to seek this remedy, it is likely that it will be a
facet of settlements in a wider range of enforcement actions, such as Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act cases involving overseas bribery.
" See Financial Stability Oversight Council, Authority to Require Supervision and
Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 76 Fed Reg 4555, 4555 (2011).
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to interfere with corporate policies or otherwise influence the
operation of a company. A corporation's board has the ultimate
responsibility to ensure that officers and directors are acting
properly, which engenders an obligation to ensure the company
has in place sufficient internal controls to prevent and redress
wrongdoing. If a board chose to retain an executive despite sig-
nificant or persistent misconduct by the organization, or decided
to nominate a director who served at another company engaged
in such violations, that may show that the officers and directors
have become entrenched and are not putting the best interests of
the corporation first. The SEC's authority to bar an officer and
director is a last resort, and a means to empower a corporate
board to take action in the first instance, so the threat of removal
is not even raised. Without the possibility of governmental action
to bar an officer or director for corporate misconduct, it will be
that much more difficult for a company to put in place new lead-
ership that can address how misconduct occurred and enhance
the likelihood it will not happen again.
IV. CONCLUSION
Using an administrative remedy against a corporate execu-
tive will not satisfy those who want to see a "perp walk," in
which individuals are paraded in handcuffs as they walk to court
for the first time to face criminal charges. The filing of a civil in-
junctive action or administrative order does not provide the kind
of visceral relief that criminal charges can, but that is hardly a
reason to change the criminal law to allow for more prosecutions
of corporate executives because of questionable or risky business
decisions.
The catchphrase "the buck stops here" is a favorite of leaders
everywhere, an acknowledgement of their position at or near the
top of an organization that permits them to acknowledge wrong-
doing or failures while deflecting any direct personal responsibil-
ity for it. If the buck truly does stop with the chief executive and
senior managers, then there should be a means to hold them ac-
countable for corporate violations by giving the government the
authority to remove them from office and prohibit them from
again sitting atop an organization when there was significant or
persistent wrongdoing on their watch.
The proposal to expand the SEC's authority to bar corporate
executives when there has been significant or persistent miscon-
duct during their tenure will not necessarily strike fear in the
hearts of corporate executives, but then it is not intended to. This
128 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
authority would allow the government to police corporate man-
agement that tolerates or turns a blind eye to misconduct, all the
while mouthing the usual platitudes that compliance is a priority
for the business. It is a modest step in enhancing oversight of
management that does not interfere with the conduct of a busi-
ness while allowing for executives to be held accountable when
the corporation engages in significant misconduct that cannot be
traced directly to them as long as it occurred on their watch.
